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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This i s a response by i n v i t a t i o n of the Court t o the 
a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for rehear ing of the C o u r t ' s per curiam 
o p i n i o n f i l e d October 2 0 , 1986 . S t a t e v. Hamil ton, 4 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 11 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . There t h e Court in t h e second paragraph 
f u l l y addressed a l l of the i s s u e s r a i s e d by the f a c t s on appeal 
by d e f i n i n g t h e two i s s u e s as being (1) t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e 
,to appo int an a t t o r n e y or o b t a i n a waiver of r i g h t t o c o u n s e l ; 
and (2) t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o appoint counse l (a l though 
never r e q u e s t e d ) on h i s f i r s t a p p e a l . In i t s per curiam d e c i s i o n 
t h e Court c l e a r l y not only d e l i n i a t e s t h a t i s s s u e of wa iv ing t h e 
r i g h t t o a p p e l l a t e counse l ( i d . 11 11 1) but h o l d s " n e i t h e r judge 
denied defendant t h e r i g h t t o t a l k with h i s l a y c o u n s e l , and 
n e i t h e r i n t e r f e r e d with the defendant when the defendant a v a i l e d 
h i m s e l f of t h a t r i g h t . There i s s t i l l "nothing i n t h e record 
be fore us t h a t would mandate a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t h e r e . " i d . p. 
1 2 , l a s t paragraph. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although "defendant has not furnished us with a 
transcript of the jury trial but merely transcripts of his 
several preliminary hearingsf to the extent that it is before us, 
the record reveals that defendant in those hearings gave notice 
and demand for counsel of choice, accompanied by a brief 31 pages 
long. Both in the appellate and trial briefs and in oral trial 
argument, defendant demanded that his lay counsel be heard and he 
represent himsel, and "there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that appellate counsel was refused and that defendant at that 
stage had requested legal counsel." (First emphasis ours.) Id. 
p. 11, paragraph 4. The fact is that this Court clearly found 
that "neither judge denied defendant the right to talk with his 
lay counsel, and neither interfered when the defendant availed 
himself of the right." £d. p. 12. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT'S OPINION ADDRESSES THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE APPEAL AND ON THE RECORD 
R u l e 35 of t h e R u l e s of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e o n l y a l l o w s 
a r e h e a r i n g i f t h e c o u r t h a s o v e r l o o k e d or m i s a p p r e h e n d e d p o i n t s 
of law or f a c t and such i s s u e s must be s t a t e d w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y . 
T h i s C o u r t ' s s t a n d a r d f o r r e h e a r i n g i s t h a t t h e p o i n t a r g u e d must 
be m a t e r i a l and w i l l a f f e c t t h e c a s e r e s u l t s . I t mus t h a v e 
" m i s a p p l i e d or o v e r l o o k e d s o m e t h i n g which m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t s t h e 
r e s u l t . " Cummings v . N e l s o n , 129 P . 6 1 9 , 624 (Utah 1 9 1 3 ) , and 
Brown v . P i c k a r d , 11 P. 512 (Utah 1 8 8 6 ) . 
T h i s Cour t c l e a r l y d i d n o t e r r i n i t s per c u r i a m 
d e c i s i o n and a l t h o u g h t h e a p p e l l a n t may wish a l o n g e r o p i n i o n , 
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based on the scanty record presented the Court has clearly 
addressed the issue of right to counsel on the first appeal of an 
appellant who is deliberately and "with eyes open" demanding his 
basis constitutional right to represent himself or for lay 
counsel and with knowledge and some legal sophistication 
rejecting any offers of any licensed counsel. As this Court 
pointed out in its decision, the defendant/appellant in his brief 
to the Appellate Court below, though similar to the one filed in 
the Trial Court, not only rejects any encroachment upon his right 
to lay counsel, again historically and conclusively demands his 
common law right to be represented by a "friend" rather than an 
attorney, and makes written demands for his right to defend 
himself without "being subject to exorbitant legal fees of a 
closed shop union." (Addendum A, respondent's appeal brief, p. 
11.) 
Defendant clearly chose to and asked to be his own pro 
se counsel. For example, "Defendant also asks the Court to take 
Judicial Notice that other Defendants in criminal cases are 
allowed to plan their defenses minus interference by the Courts, 
and Defendant herein claims that same right." (Addendum A, p. 
22.) As pointed out by this Court, both the trial court and the 
appellate court allowed that opportunity and right as demanded in 
writing and did not interfere with it. 
These issues were addressed by this Court and by both 
counsel in their briefs. As pointed out, "of reference to this 
case (Angersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1975)) under these 
entire circumstances shows that this defendant knew at all stages 
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of the appeal that he could have a member of the bar represent 
him if he so des ired . (R. 354) ." (Respondent's br ie f , p. 23. ) 
"He c l ear ly knew he could have but did not want an attorney from 
the bar. He made a knowing and voluntary waiver of h i s right to 
an attorney and chose to par t i c ipa te in the court proceedings and 
the d i s t r i c t court appealed pro s e . " Appel lant 's br ief , p. 25. 
This Court c l ear ly says in i t s per curiam opinion as 
did the United S t a t e s Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, that i f an individual vo luntar i ly demands the bas ic 
cons t i tu t iona l r ight to represent themselves or knowingly waives 
or r e j e c t s the right to counsel , or even advisory counsel , then 
the t r i a l courts and the appe l la te courts have the d i s c r e t i o n t o 
not only appoint advisory counsel but to allow the unfetered use 
of the cons t i tu t iona l r ight to represent one's s e l f . 
The dec is ion points out as did the United S ta te s 
Supreme Court, that the appellant "has the burden of showing, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not have counsel and 
did not competently and i n t e l l i g e n t l y waive h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
right to the a s s i s t a n c e of counse l ." The Supreme Court a l so 
i n f e r s that where the circumstances show that the a p p e l l a n t ' s 
r ights would have been f a i r l y protected without counsel , the due 
process c lause would not inva l ida te h i s conv ic t ion , e s p e c i a l l y 
where in a s t a t e case , the defendant "should carry the same 
burden of proving non-waiver as required of a defendant in a 
federal case ." Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 
L.Ed. 2d, 167 (1957) . As pointed out in the appeal br ie f , the 
appel lant would put t h i s Court and a l l appe l la te courts on the 
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horns of a dilemma by forcing the courts to allow him to 
represent himself and then forcing the courts to, through some 
sophisticated knowledge of the law and historical gymnastics, to 
then impose an unfriendly licensed attorney upon him in order to 
obtain a rehearing and start the circle again. But this Court 
stopped that abuse in its memorandum decision by pointing out 
that only the infamous Star Chambers Tribunal would adopt a 
practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant. As this 
Court has pointed out, either in a trial or appellate stage, "it 
is well established that a defendant does not have an immutable 
right under our state or the federal constitution to reject court 
appointed counsel for the purpose of forcing the court appoint 
private counsel of his own choice. State v. Wulffenstein, 27 
Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (1986). Nor does he have the constitutional 
right to be represented by lay or unlicensed counsel.* (Emphasis 
respondent's, supra p. 12.) 
The memorandum decision says, and the scanty but not 
silent record shows, that this particular defendant chose 
voluntarily to represent himself and knowingly rejected licensed 
counsel and now attempts to claim that an appellate court erred 
in not appointing advisory counsel even though it was not 
requested by defense "counsel pro se." This Court cites U. S. v. 
01 sen, 576 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 896 
(1978), for the judges having a similar situation. After citing 
from Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.3d. 2d 562, 95 
S.Ct. 2525 (1975) and the language cited by this Court on "fair 
ascertainment" that the defendant will not accept licensed 
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counself the 01 sen Court quotes, "indeed, we have rejected the 
view that a defendant has a right to both represent himself and 
to be represented by counsel—even if a request for such hybrid 
representation is made. United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 
123 (8th Cir. 1976). As noted in Williams, the matter is 
properly left to the discretion of the trial court, and there is 
no abuse of discretion here. We add that 01 sen, in fact, 
exhibited considerably more courtroom skill than would most lay 
persons." 01 sen at 1270. (As did this defendant if one listens 
to the trial tapes or reads the trial briefs.) This Court leaves 
not only the trial judge but the appellant judge with discretion 
in the face of a revealed sophisticated appellant rejecting 
•stealthy encroachment upon his right to counsel" pointing out 
"there is nothing in the record to indicate that appellate 
counsel was refused and that defendant at that stage had 
requested legal counsel. " 
The record in fact shows that the appellant here chose 
t.o represent himself and never requested counsel until this Court 
later determined that he was indigent and appointed counsel. And 
of course, since this Court did appoint counsel, the cases on 
counsel for indigent appellants cited in the petition for a 
rehearing have not been violated, since this appellate court did 
appoint counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
As argued on appeal, since this defendant has failed to 
provide a complete and adequate record this Court need not rule 
on mere allegations in the appeal. As the Court said in its 
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memorandum d e c i s i o n , " there i s nothing in the record to indicate 
that appel late counsel was refused and that defendant at that 
stage had requested l ega l counsel ," 
In any event, with sophis t i ca ted knowledge the 
appel lant in writ ing in h i s brief to the d i s t r i c t court continued 
to demand the right to represent himself and made i t c lear that 
the Star Chamber proceedings would not be allowed to force 
l i c ensed counsel upon him. As t h i s Court sa id , c i t i n g the eighth 
c i r c u i t both "judges acknowledged the defendant's r ight to 
defendant himself ," The Court in i t s dec i s ion acknowledged as 
one of the two i s s u e s the d i s t r i c t cour t ' s f a i l u r e to appoint 
counsel on his " f i r s t appeal ." The Court a l so acknowledged that 
defendant waived h i s r ight to l i censed counsel and pointed out 
that "neither judge denied defendant the right to talk with h i s 
lay counsel , and nei ther interfered when the defendant avai led 
himself of that r i gh t ." This Court r igh t fu l l y concluded from the 
tenor of the defendant's appe l la te brief and h i s demeanor before 
the Trial Court, the same as the reviewing court in 01 sen and the 
reviewing Utah d i s t r i c t court, that a l l courts say that af ter 
f a i r ascertainment that the defendant w i l l not accept l i censed 
counsel , the Courts have d i s cre t ion t o not appoint advisory 
counsel at t r i a l or on appeal. 
Since there i s nothing material on the record pursuant 
to Appel late Rule 35 or any wrong principal of law that would 
mater ia l ly e f f ec t the r e s u l t s , the p e t i t i o n for rehearing should 
be denied. 
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